



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24215
30 June 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 30 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to present to you the letter, dated 25 June 1992, from
the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, H.E. Mr. Alija Izetbegović.

May I ask for your kind assistance in having the letter distributed to
the member Missions of the Security Council, and having the letter entered as
a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 25 June 1992 from His Excellency Mr. Alija Izetbegović,
President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, addressed to the President of
the Security Council

Sarajevo, 25 June 1992

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I wish to draw the attention of the United Nations Security Council to the increased activity of airplanes of the Yugoslav Army against civilian targets in my country.

On 23rd June warplanes of the Yugoslav Army attacked Visoko, 20 km from Sarajevo, where they destroyed a medium wave transmitter of Radio Sarajevo which had covered the entire country. On 24th June they bombarded Goražde (the second time in a week), Kladanj, Odžak, Modriča, and made a rocket attack on the TV relay station on mount Bjelašnica near Sarajevo. Today they have made repeated flights over Sarajevo and the surrounding places.

All this indicates not only that the Yugoslav Army has not withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with the relevant resolution of the United Nations Security Council, but also that it is continuing its aggression against my country using all the means at its disposal.

We would appreciate this letter to be distributed as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Alija Izetbegović
President of the Presidency



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OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

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the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, H.E. Mr. Alija Izetbegovic.

May I ask for your kind assistance in having the letter distributed to
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(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 29 June 1992 from His Excellency Mr. Alija Izetbegovic,
President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, addressed to the President of
the Security Council

URGENT

We very much hope that Sarajevo airport will shortly be opened so that Sarajevo, and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, can begin to receive the humanitarian aid which they so desperately need.

We on our side have not placed any obstacles in the way of the implementation of resolution 758. Any difficulties that may have arisen and been reported by UNPROFOR will be the result of provocations on the part of the Serbian extremists. They have reduced their artillery activity around the airport, but have intensified their attacks in other sectors, notably the old part of Sarajevo. During the past 24 hours 4 civilians have been killed, and 32 wounded, in the city.

Until the entire city of Sarajevo is freed from this nightmare, the international community cannot be considered to have fulfilled its humanitarian mission.

At the same time we wish to draw the attention of the members of the United Nations Security Council to the fact that the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina is continuing with unflagging ferocity and brutality. An ethnic cleansing of entire regions, a segregation of populations, is being carried out, the like of which has not been seen since the Second World War. The whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina is being turned into one big concentration camp.

The appeal for help addressed to the United Nations by 50,000 citizens of Banja Luka bears witness to this. They seek to be allowed to flee from that city where they are being subjected to threats that they will be taken to concentration camps and physically liquidated.

For these reasons we continue to expect that the Security Council, because of the non-fulfilment of its demands expressed in resolution 752, will take effective measures to protect from aggression the youngest Member State of the world Organization.

We wish this letter to be treated as a Security Council document, and to be distributed to the Security Council members accordingly.

(Signed) Alija Izetbegovic



Security Council

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S/24217
30 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 30 JUNE 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 29 June 1992 from Mr. Ahmad Hussein, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir K. K. AL-NIMA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Letter dated 29 June 1992 from the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to acquaint you with the practices adopted in the name of the Committee established by Security Council resolution 661 (1990), known as "the Sanctions Committee" and represented in the decisions imposed on the Committee by the representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, for the purpose of persisting in harming and injuring Iraq and the Iraqi people.

The Iraqi people is suffering daily as a result of those decisions, which contain biased and unlawful interpretations of Security Council resolutions concerning economic sanctions against Iraq, the only objective of which, in our opinion, is to put a stranglehold on the Iraqi people, in the service of hostile political aims that govern the method of operation of the representatives of the three States on the Committee, particularly when we bear in mind that Iraq has fulfilled its obligations under the Security Council resolutions.

The continuation of these policies and use of the pretext of international legitimacy to support them constitutes a threat to the future of the whole Iraqi people.

The excesses and arrogance of the United States of America and the United Kingdom reached the point where they burned the food of the people in more than 22 villages in Dohuk and Ninawa governorates, during the period from 27 May 1992 to 13 June 1992, and destroyed the wheat and barley crops of farmers in those areas. To this were added the decisions adopted by the Committee on Sanctions at its 72nd meeting on 19 June 1992, through the opposition of the representatives of those same States - decisions that constitute blatant crimes to be added to their earlier crimes aimed at putting a stranglehold on the Iraqi people and depriving it of its most elementary fundamental humanitarian and civil rights.

A careful look at items 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 13 and 15 of those decisions indicates the extent of the arbitrariness and unfairness that have beset the Iraqi people as a result of the Committee's interpretation and implementation of Security Council resolutions concerning the economic sanctions. In addition, there is the Committee's treatment of Iraqi applications relating to the basic civilian needs of the Iraqi people and affecting its daily life. These examples are but a trifling portion of the obvious arbitrariness of the Committee's decisions. Below we give the negative decisions adopted by the Committee at its latest meeting, on 19 June 1992, referred to above.

Objection to the removal of two Iraqi Boeing 727s from Tunis and Amman to Baghdad for operation on the Baghdad-Basra-Baghdad domestic line. The objection was raised by the United Kingdom representative, as usual. (The

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United Kingdom representative has made 38 objections out of a total of 60 cases of refusal and objection.) The objector's argument was that such removal was in breach of resolution 661 (1990). He commented that this resolution does not deal with the question of aviation for, otherwise, the Security Council would not have adopted resolution 670 (1990) concerning the question of aviation. Our proof of this is that Iraqi aviation continued until 15 January 1991, and no one objected on the basis of resolution 661 (1990). The United Kingdom representative also pointed out that domestic flights were not a humanitarian issue and did not form part of the basic needs of the Iraqi people.

How does the United Kingdom representative understand basic needs as we approach the twenty-first century? How does the United Kingdom representative understand the necessity of rapid transport for civilian travel in order to meet the needs of citizens for settling urgent affairs over a distance of more than 550 kilometres?

The representatives of the United States, France and Japan supported the arguments of the United Kingdom representative, and the application was therefore rejected.

The Committee rejected the supply of raw materials for the leather industry to the State Establishment for the Leather Industry as proposed by the Moroccan delegation, with delivery by the Moroccan Bata company. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom rejected this application on the basis that it would help to rebuild the Iraqi economic infrastructure, and the request was therefore refused. What logic governs the decisions of the Committee and rejects such a request, which meets the most elementary human needs, not only in Iraq but anywhere in the world? Is not the wearing of shoes one of the most elementary human rights?

Do the Western information media not shed crocodile tears for the world's poor, showing them naked and barefoot? Do they want Iraqis to have such a fate after making great headway in development by their unadulterated effort? Today, the Americans and the British want to rob them of their gains and return them to centuries past. Is anything that helps the Iraqi economic infrastructure something banned and unlawful? This position that indicts the Commission and causes the adoption of ignoble attitudes in its name indicates what they have in mind for the world with their new international order.

On the other hand, the Committee approved the application for the supply of ready-made shoes to Iraq. Then why should the Committee oppose the supply to Iraq of the prerequisites for manufacturing shoes, when it approved the import of ready-made shoes? Does that not mean the killing of Iraqi industry on which dozens of Iraqi workers and technicians depend, exposing them to unemployment, displacement and starvation, together with the related sales personnel and intermediaries. The anticipated damage will not be limited to that, inasmuch as depriving the leather and shoe industry of certain production requirements means that a considerable portion of the raw materials produced locally will be left unused, since they cannot be exported (under the same sanctions!).

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The United States and French representatives blocked an application from the Jordanian Mission whereby a number of Jordanian companies offered to supply Iraq with the following materials: 85 tons of water pumps, including pumps for agricultural purposes; 200 tons of steel piping for water; and 150 tons of plastic piping for water. On the grounds of seeking additional information on the substance of the application and the end-user of the materials. Once again, how does the Committee interpret this illegal and immoral conduct in its name? What other uses are there for water pipes except that for which they are designed? Are not these pipes a basic civilian commodity? Who would use them other than the Iraqi population. What is this but the heresy espoused by those who harbour ill intentions vis-à-vis Iraqis?

In the case of another application from Jordanian Mission regarding permission for the Shahin National Trading Corporation to supply Iraq with electric pumps to be imported from Italy and electric pumps and spare parts for them to be imported from India, a procedural problem was raised: since the materials requested would be imported from Italy and India, India and Italy would have to be consulted in the matter. Thus, this application was suspended. Tomorrow, when India and Italy agree to supply the goods, the constant objectors will perhaps adduce fresh arguments, for example, that the requested materials constitute a large quantity, or that they do not know who is the end-user, or that they will help the Iraqi economic infrastructure - those arguments that have been repeated so often and rejected by all who have regard for the principles of justice, fairness and humanity.

Great Britain blocked an application from Turkey to supply the private sector in the town of Dohuk with 70,000 square metres of glass plates on the grounds that consultation with Turkey was necessary.

The United Kingdom representative also objected to Turkey's supplying the private sector with 80,000 plywood veneer units on the grounds that that would help the Iraqi infrastructure. The United Kingdom and France also objected to the Italian company Texim supplying the General Establishment for Cereals with the following equipment: 20 fixed bakeries; 5 kneading machines; 10 steam generators; 20 mobile bakeries; 10 ovens, on the same untenable pretext, namely, that they would strengthen the Iraqi economic infrastructure. How would this simple equipment for making bread for the people affect the Iraqi economic infrastructure, on which some 20 million depend? Is the Iraqi people now forbidden to manufacture its daily bread itself and therefore prohibited from importing that equipment? Will the objectors one day put it to the Sanctions Committee that we should import ready-made loaves from them?

The game that is being played in the name of the Sanctions Committee has been revealed. It is an endeavour to reduce the Iraqi people to poverty and to harm it. Otherwise, what relation is there between the logic of rejection employed by the United States, the United Kingdom and France and the Security Council resolutions under which Iraq has fulfilled its obligation.

Silence regarding these disgraceful actions for which the Sanctions Committee is being used as a cover is silence regarding a crime committed

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against a people in the name of international legitimacy as understood and applied by the three permanent members of the Security Council and their representative on the Sanctions Committee.

I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the United Nations.

(Signed) Ahmad HUSSEIN
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq



Security Council

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S/24218
30 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 30 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION
OF SENEGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Senegal to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretariat of the Organization and has the honour to transmit to it, for publication as an official document of the Security Council, the final communiqué of the second evaluation meeting of the Committee of Five of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), held at Dakar on 21 June 1992.

Annex

Final Communiqué of the Second Evaluation Meeting of the
ECOWAS Committee of Five held at Dakar on 21 June 1992

Pursuant to the decision taken at Dakar on 11 May 1992 by the ministerial evaluation meeting of the ECOWAS Committee of Five, a second evaluation meeting of the Committee was held at Dakar on 21 June 1992.

The States members of the Community Standing Mediation Committee also participated in this gathering, as did Guinea and Sierra Leone.

The meeting was attended by the following Ministers for Foreign Affairs:

- Mr. Amara Essy, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire,
- Mr. Djibo Ka, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Senegal,
- Mr. Oumar Sey, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Gambia,
- Mr. Cheaka A. Toure, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Togolese Republic,
- Mr. Dumbuya, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Sierra Leone,
- Mr. Mamadou Diarra, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali,
- Mr. Gabriel B. Matthews, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Interim Government of the Republic of Liberia,
- Mr. Ibrahim Sylla, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Guinea;

The following representatives:

- Mr. Arfan A. Camara, Ambassador of Guinea-Bissau,
- Colonel Montaga Diallo, ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG),
- General Ishaya Bakut, ECOMOG Commander-in-Chief,
- Mr. Mouhamed Ibn Chambas, Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Ghana,
- Mr. Harouna Kouela, Director of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Burkina Faso,

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- Mr. John T. Richardson, National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL),
- Mr. A. M. S. Yarima, Ambassador of Nigeria to Senegal;

And the following Chiefs of Staff:

- Colonel Aboubakr Dada, Commander-in-Chief of the Gambian National Army,
- Army Air Corps General Mamadou M. Seck, Chief of the General Staff of the Senegalese Army,
- Colonel Sanoussi Conde, Chief of the General Staff of the Guinean Army,
- Colonel Souleymane Daffe, Chief of the General Staff of the Malian Army.

Results of the deliberations

1. The participants in the evaluation meeting reviewed the developments in the Liberian situation since the meeting held at Dakar on 11 May 1992.

After hearing a report by General Bakut on the progress of the field operations, the participants noted with dismay the death of six Senegalese soldiers as a result of an incident which occurred on 28 May 1992 at Vahun, in the sector occupied by the Senegalese contingent of ECOMOG.

After rendering a stirring tribute to the ECOMOG soldiers' courage and sense of self-sacrifice, and that of the Senegalese contingent in particular, the participants paid their respects to the memory of the dead.

The participants condemned with the utmost vigour the murder by NPFL supporters of Senegalese soldiers on a peace mission to Liberia.

They noted with satisfaction the fraternal solidarity which the Liberian people showed ECOMOG on this occasion.

They then urged the Commander-in-Chief of ECOMOG to continue to implement his programme of action according to an updated schedule which will be reviewed periodically.

The participants recommended that if the implementation of this programme should be hampered again, the heads of State should adopt appropriate concerted measures, including a possible economic and financial embargo.

2. The participants once again called upon all the Liberian factions, including Charles Taylor's NPFL, to observe the spirit and letter of the Yamoussoukro Accord signed on 30 October 1991 (the fourth Yamoussoukro

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Accord), as clarified at the ECOWAS summit meeting in Geneva, and to collaborate in good faith with ECOMOG in the implementation of the programme of action.

In this connection, the participants expressed the need for Charles Taylor's NPFL to impart to its combatants a correct understanding of the neutrality and the peace mission of ECOMOG in Liberia.

3. The participants recommended that the ECOWAS countries which do not have contingents in Liberia should help to strengthen ECOMOG by sending troops.

4. They reaffirmed their countries' determination to carry out the process now under way in a spirit of solidarity.

5. They appealed to the international community to provide greater assistance to ECOMOG.

6. Lastly, they called upon all Governments and non-governmental organizations to withhold all forms of assistance to the electoral process in Liberia, until such time as the provisions of the fourth Yamoussoukro Accord have been fully implemented.

7. A detailed report on the implementation of the fourth Yamoussoukro Accord will be made to the next ECOWAS summit meeting.

8. A decision was taken to hold the next evaluation meeting at Monrovia, on a date to be set later.

Done at Dakar on 21 June 1992

For the meeting:

Djibo Ka
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of Senegal
Chairman



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S/24219
1 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 22 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF THAILAND TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Representative of Thailand to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to the latter's note dated 3 June 1992, has the honour to inform him that the Royal Thai Government has taken note of Security Council resolution 757 (1992) and has issued a directive to all Thai authorities concerned to abide strictly by the provisions of the said Security Council resolution.



Security Council

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S/24220
1 July 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 22 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT
MISSION OF FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to his note of 3 June 1992, has the honour to inform him that the following measures have been taken, either by the European Community or by the French Government, with a view to implementing Security Council resolution 757 (1992):

(a) Trade embargo (para. 4 of Security Council resolution 757 (1992)): European Council Regulation EEC No. 1432/92 of 1 June 1992 prohibits trade between the European Economic Community and the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro. Decision 92/285 adopted by the representatives of the States members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) prohibits trade with the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro;

(b) Freezing of assets and cessation of financial dealings (para. 5 of Security Council resolution 757 (1992)): Decree 92-487 of 4 June 1992 makes all financial dealings between France and the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro subject to prior authorization;

(c) Air embargo (para. 7 of Security Council resolution 757 (1992)): European Council Regulation EEC No. 1432/92 of 1 June 1992 denies permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly the territory of the Community if it is destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of Serbia or Montenegro;

The Prime Minister's Circular No. 984 of 9 June 1992 provides instructions for the implementation of the Regulation by France;

(d) Reduction of the level of the staff at diplomatic missions and consular posts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (para. 8 (a) of Security Council resolution 757 (1992)): The staff of the Embassy of Yugoslavia in France has been sharply reduced. Depending on how the situation develops, France is considering the possibility of requesting the departure of diplomats who have remained at their posts;

(e) Sporting events (para. 8 (b) of Security Council resolution 757 (1992)): On 4 June 1992, the Minister of Youth and Sport sent an instruction to his external services to implement this measure in close cooperation with the sports movement. The Ministry has sent a letter to all chairmen of sports federations requesting them to ensure the implementation of this provision;

(f) Suspension of scientific and technical cooperation and cultural exchanges and visits from official representatives of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (para. 8 (c) of Security Council resolution 757 (1992)):

- (i) In a circular dated 9 June, the Prime Minister requested the relevant bodies to suspend all agreements concluded in this field and to halt activities begun under those agreements. He also called for the immediate cessation of technical cooperation of a military nature (assistance, training) and related courses of instruction;
- (ii) The French Cultural Centre at Belgrade has suspended its activities, and planned cultural events have been cancelled. Moreover, no new scholarship applications have been accepted and exchange programmes for young people have been suspended;

(g) Necessary measures to avoid claims from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (para. 9 of Security Council resolution 757 (1992)): France considers it necessary for the Community to adopt a regulation on this subject.



Security Council

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GENERAL

S/24221
1 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 12
OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 757 (1992)

1. On 30 May 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 757 (1992) in connection with its consideration of letters dated 26 and 27 May 1992 (S/23997, S/24024) and a report submitted by the Secretary-General (S/24000) pursuant to Security Council resolution 752 (1992).
2. By resolution 757 (1992) the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decided that all States should adopt measures pursuant to paragraphs 4 to 9 of the resolution unless the Council decided that the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), had taken effective measures to fulfil the requirements of resolution 752 (1992). At the same time, under paragraph 12, the Council requested all States to report to the Secretary-General by 22 June 1992 on the measures they had instituted for meeting their obligations under resolution 757 (1992).
3. The full text of paragraphs 4 to 11 of resolution 757 (1992) reads as follows:

 [The Security Council,

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 Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,]

 ...

4. Decides that all States shall prevent:

 (a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;

 (b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or trans shipment of

any commodities or products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or aircraft or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for the purposes of such activities or dealings;

(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any commodities or products, whether or not originating in their territories, but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and foodstuffs notified to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991), to any person or body in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products;

5. Decides that all States shall not make available to the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to those authorities or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and foodstuffs;

6. Decides that the prohibitions in paragraphs 4 and 5 above shall not apply to the trans-shipment through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of commodities and products originating outside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and temporarily present in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) only for the purpose of such trans-shipment, in accordance with guidelines approved by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991);

7. Decides that all States shall:

(a) Deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory if it is destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), unless the particular flight has been approved, for humanitarian or other purposes consistent with the relevant resolutions of the Council, by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991);

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(b) Prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, the provision of engineering and maintenance servicing of aircraft registered in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or operated by or on behalf of entities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or components for such aircraft, the certification of airworthiness for such aircraft, and the payment of new claims against existing insurance contracts and the provision of new direct insurance for such aircraft;

8. Decides that all States shall:

(a) Reduce the level of the staff at diplomatic missions and consular posts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);

(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the participation in sporting events on their territory of persons or groups representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);

(c) Suspend scientific and technical cooperation and cultural exchanges and visits involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);

9. Decides that all States, and the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or of any person or body in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution and related resolutions;

10. Decides that the measures imposed by this resolution shall not apply to activities related to UNPROFOR, to the Conference on Yugoslavia or to the European Community Monitor Mission, and that States, parties and others concerned shall cooperate fully with UNPROFOR, the Conference on Yugoslavia and the European Community Monitor Mission and respect fully their freedom of movement and the safety of their personnel;

11. Calls upon all States, including States not members of the United Nations, and all international organizations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the date of the present resolution;

4. Immediately following the adoption of resolution 757 (1992), the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution by telegram to the

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Ministers for Foreign Affairs of all States. Subsequently, on 3 June 1992, the Secretary-General addressed a note verbale to all States again transmitting the text of the resolution, drawing particular attention to paragraphs 4 to 9 thereof.

5. As of 22 June 1992, 55 replies were received pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 757 (1992). Each of the replies has been issued as a document of the Security Council in the chronological order of the communications, as indicated below:

Qatar	(8.6.1992)	S/24088
Djibouti	(9.6.1992)	S/24089
Paraguay	(11.6.1992)	S/24095
Uruguay	(12.6.1992)	S/24101
Poland	(15.6.1992)	S/24119
Burkina Faso	(16.6.1992)	S/24125
United Kingdom	(17.6.1992)	S/24122
Moldova	(17.6.1992)	S/24187
United Arab Emirates	(18.6.1992)	S/24123
Jamaica	(18.6.1992)	S/24124
Liechtenstein	(18.6.1992)	S/24126
Israel	(18.6.1992)	S/24127
Finland	(18.6.1992)	S/24130
Slovenia	(19.6.1992)	S/24120
India	(19.6.1992)	S/24128
Mexico	(19.6.1992)	S/24132
Portugal, on behalf of the European Community	(19.6.1992)	S/24133
Cuba	(19.6.1992)	S/24134
Italy	(19.6.1992)	S/24135
Sweden	(19.6.1992)	S/24146
Australia	(19.6.1992)	S/24149
Germany	(22.6.1992)	S/24131
Austria	(22.6.1992)	S/24141
Romania	(22.6.1992)	S/24142
Hungary	(22.6.1992)	S/24147
Cyprus	(22.6.1992)	S/24148
Czechoslovakia	(22.6.1992)	S/24150
Botswana	(22.6.1992)	S/24151
Malta	(22.6.1992)	S/24152 and Corr.1
Greece	(22.6.1992)	S/24155
Japan	(22.6.1992)	S/24156
Portugal	(22.6.1992)	S/24157
Albania	(22.6.1992)	S/24158
Singapore	(22.6.1992)	S/24159
Switzerland	(22.6.1992)	S/24160
Brazil	(22.6.1992)	S/24167
Bulgaria	(22.6.1992)	S/24168
Denmark	(22.6.1992)	S/24170
New Zealand	(22.6.1992)	S/24171

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Ukraine	(22.6.1992)	S/24172
Republic of Korea	(22.6.1992)	S/24173
Poland (further communication)	(22.6.1992)	S/24174
Saudi Arabia	(22.6.1992)	S/24175
Canada	(22.6.1992)	S/24176
Turkey	(22.6.1992)	S/24190
Sri Lanka	(22.6.1992)	S/24191
Belgium	(22.6.1992)	S/24192
United States	(22.6.1992)	S/24193
Luxembourg	(22.6.1992)	S/24194
Chile	(22.6.1992)	S/24195
China	(22.6.1992)	S/24196
Ireland	(22.6.1992)	S/24202
Guyana	(22.6.1992)	S/24203
Thailand	(22.6.1992)	S/24219
France	(22.6.1992)	S/24220



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6 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 12
OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 757 (1992)

1. On 30 May 1992, the Security Council adopted resolution 757 (1992) in connection with its consideration of letters dated 26 and 27 May 1992 (S/23997, S/24024) and a report submitted by the Secretary-General (S/24000) pursuant to Security Council resolution 752 (1992).

2. By resolution 757 (1992) the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decided that all States should adopt measures pursuant to paragraphs 4 to 9 of the resolution unless the Council decided that the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), had taken effective measures to fulfil the requirements of resolution 752 (1992). At the same time, under paragraph 12, the Council requested all States to report to the Secretary-General by 22 June 1992 on the measures they had instituted for meeting their obligations under resolution 757 (1992).

3. The full text of paragraphs 4 to 11 of resolution 757 (1992) reads as follows:

[The Security Council,

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Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,]

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4. Decides that all States shall prevent:

(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;

* Reissued for technical reasons.

(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or transshipment of any commodities or products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); and any dealings by their nationals or their flag vessels or aircraft or in their territories in any commodities or products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for the purposes of such activities or dealings;

(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any commodities or products, whether or not originating in their territories, but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and foodstuffs notified to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991), to any person or body in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or to any person or body for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products;

5. Decides that all States shall not make available to the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to those authorities or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and foodstuffs;

6. Decides that the prohibitions in paragraphs 4 and 5 above shall not apply to the transshipment through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of commodities and products originating outside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and temporarily present in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) only for the purpose of such transshipment, in accordance with guidelines approved by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991);

7. Decides that all States shall:

(a) Deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory if it is destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), unless the particular flight has been approved, for humanitarian or other purposes consistent with the relevant resolutions of the Council, by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991);

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(b) Prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, the provision of engineering and maintenance servicing of aircraft registered in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or operated by or on behalf of entities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or components for such aircraft, the certification of airworthiness for such aircraft, and the payment of new claims against existing insurance contracts and the provision of new direct insurance for such aircraft;

8. Decides that all States shall:

(a) Reduce the level of the staff at diplomatic missions and consular posts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);

(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the participation in sporting events on their territory of persons or groups representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);

(c) Suspend scientific and technical cooperation and cultural exchanges and visits involving persons or groups officially sponsored by or representing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);

9. Decides that all States, and the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or of any person or body in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures imposed by this resolution and related resolutions;

10. Decides that the measures imposed by this resolution shall not apply to activities related to UNPROFOR, to the Conference on Yugoslavia or to the European Community Monitor Mission, and that States, parties and others concerned shall cooperate fully with UNPROFOR, the Conference on Yugoslavia and the European Community Monitor Mission and respect fully their freedom of movement and the safety of their personnel;

11. Calls upon all States, including States not members of the United Nations, and all international organizations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the date of the present resolution;

4. Immediately following the adoption of resolution 757 (1992), the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution by telegram to the

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Ministers for Foreign Affairs of all States. Subsequently, on 3 June 1992, the Secretary-General addressed a note verbale to all States again transmitting the text of the resolution, drawing particular attention to paragraphs 4 to 9 thereof.

5. As of 22 June 1992, 59 replies were received pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 757 (1992). Each of the replies has been issued as a document of the Security Council in the chronological order of the communications, as indicated below:

Qatar	(8.6.1992)	S/24088
Djibouti	(9.6.1992)	S/24089
Paraguay	(11.6.1992)	S/24095
Uruguay	(12.6.1992)	S/24101
Poland	(15.6.1992)	S/24119
Peru	(15.6.1992)	S/24106
Burkina Faso	(16.6.1992)	S/24125
United Kingdom	(17.6.1992)	S/24122
Norway	(17.6.1992)	S/24143
Moldova	(17.6.1992)	S/24187
United Arab Emirates	(18.6.1992)	S/24123
Jamaica	(18.6.1992)	S/24124
Liechtenstein	(18.6.1992)	S/24126
Israel	(18.6.1992)	S/24127
Finland	(18.6.1992)	S/24130
Slovenia	(19.6.1992)	S/24120
India	(19.6.1992)	S/24128
Mexico	(19.6.1992)	S/24132
Portugal, on behalf of the European Community	(19.6.1992)	S/24133
Cuba	(19.6.1992)	S/24134
Italy	(19.6.1992)	S/24135
Sweden	(19.6.1992)	S/24146
Australia	(19.6.1992)	S/24149
Germany	(22.6.1992)	S/24131
Austria	(22.6.1992)	S/24141
Romania	(22.6.1992)	S/24142
Hungary	(22.6.1992)	S/24147
Cyprus	(22.6.1992)	S/24148
Czechoslovakia	(22.6.1992)	S/24150
Botswana	(22.6.1992)	S/24151
Malta	(22.6.1992)	S/24152 and Corr.1
Greece	(22.6.1992)	S/24155
Japan	(22.6.1992)	S/24156
Portugal	(22.6.1992)	S/24157
Albania	(22.6.1992)	S/24158
Singapore	(22.6.1992)	S/24159
Switzerland	(22.6.1992)	S/24160
Nicaragua	(22.6.1992)	S/24162
Spain	(22.6.1992)	S/24163

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Brazil	(22.6.1992)	S/24167
Bulgaria	(22.6.1992)	S/24168
Denmark	(22.6.1992)	S/24170
New Zealand	(22.6.1992)	S/24171
Ukraine	(22.6.1992)	S/24172
Republic of Korea	(22.6.1992)	S/24173
Poland (further communication)	(22.6.1992)	S/24174
Saudi Arabia	(22.6.1992)	S/24175
Canada	(22.6.1992)	S/24176
Turkey	(22.6.1992)	S/24190
Sri Lanka	(22.6.1992)	S/24191
Belgium	(22.6.1992)	S/24192
United States	(22.6.1992)	S/24193
Luxembourg	(22.6.1992)	S/24194
Chile	(22.6.1992)	S/24195
China	(22.6.1992)	S/24196
Ireland	(22.6.1992)	S/24202
Guyana	(22.6.1992)	S/24203
Thailand	(22.6.1992)	S/24219
France	(22.6.1992)	S/24220



Security Council

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S/24222
2 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 JULY 1992 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In my statement of 29 June 1992 I promised to report to the Security Council on 1 July about the progress achieved in regard to the opening of Sarajevo airport. The purpose of the present letter is to bring the Council up to date on developments thus far.

First, the situation in Sarajevo, and in particular in relation to the airport, remains preoccupying. Fighting has continued in the area around the airport and in the nearby suburb of Dobrinja. Four United Nations military observers were wounded by sniper fire yesterday. The process of concentration of heavy weapons to locations where they can be supervised by United Nations military observers has not yet been completed to UNPROFOR's satisfaction. There is still debris on the runway, and mines remaining in several parts of the airport are still susceptible to accidental detonation. In these circumstances, UNPROFOR cannot consider the airport to be secure, and it must be stated that the persistence of fighting close to the airport continues to endanger the safety of both personnel and aircraft.

With regard to the deployment of additional infantry elements authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 761 (1992), the Canadian battalion travelling from Sector West in Croatia to take up security functions at the airport has encountered unexpected difficulties on the way. It had been hoped that an advance company of some 240 persons travelling ahead of the rest of the battalion could have arrived in Sarajevo today. However, obstacles encountered on the route have slowed its progress, and it is now expected that both the company and the battalion will arrive only late tomorrow, Thursday, 2 July.

An infantry company from France has, however, arrived today. The Air Traffic Control and Air Lift control elements offered by the Government of France have in great measure arrived today, with the remainder expected in Sarajevo shortly. An UNPROFOR convoy which arrived from Belgrade today brought in movement control and technical personnel as well as a detachment of marines who are being deployed at the airport. Rudimentary air traffic control functions are being performed by a skeleton staff pending their

augmentation by the necessary personnel and equipment. Manual discharging of cargo is taking place while UNHCR strives to make the necessary arrangements for the onward distribution of supplies that may be landed at the airport.

Though optimal conditions have thus not yet been achieved, UNPROFOR, in order to avoid any slackening of the momentum generated by the withdrawal of Serb forces from the airport on Monday, has operated the airport within the constraints described above. Several French aircraft have been able to fly in under Visual Flight Rules, bringing military personnel as well as some humanitarian aid, which has been distributed under the auspices of UNHCR. The Force Commander of UNPROFOR has advised me that his team at the airport can receive up to a maximum of eight flights a day during daylight hours, while efforts continue to improve the security of the airport, establish more complete air traffic control and improve arrangements for the unloading and distribution of relief items. I will keep the Council informed of any improvements in the capacity of the airport resulting from progress in overcoming these constraints.

In this connection, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs is in regular contact with UNHCR, which is the lead agency for humanitarian relief to the former Yugoslavia, as well as with other organizations involved in the provision of emergency relief to the population of Sarajevo. Inter-agency meetings concerning these relief operations are now taking place both at United Nations Headquarters and in Geneva.

A UNHCR representative has been in Sarajevo for the last two weeks, while a UNHCR Emergency Team arrived in Sarajevo today to coordinate the relief efforts. UNPROFOR will manage the airport, provide facilities for the unloading of relief supplies and ensure air control. UNHCR will coordinate relief flights, take delivery of the relief supplies and make local arrangements for their onward transportation and expeditious and impartial distribution. Priority will be given to food aid.

I urge Governments in a position to provide airlift capacity and/or relief supplies to advise UNHCR immediately in order to avoid duplication of effort. Indeed, supplies should not be dispatched without coordination of the arrangements with UNHCR. UNHCR is also continuing to negotiate with the concerned parties the opening of land routes to Sarajevo.

In conveying this information to the members of the Council, I should like to pay tribute to the Force Commander of UNPROFOR, Lt.-General Satish Nambiar, his Sarajevo Sector Commander, Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, and the dedicated personnel under their command, for their remarkable performance in extremely difficult circumstances.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24223
2 July 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication which he has received from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

S/24223
English
Page 2

Annex

Letter dated 24 June 1992 from the Director-General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency addressed to the
Secretary-General

Please find attached the report of the twelfth IAEA Inspection in Iraq under Security Council 687 (1991). You may deem it appropriate to transmit the report to the members of the Security Council. I remain, of course, available with the Chief Inspector, Mr. Demetrius Perricos for any consultations you or the Council may wish to have.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

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REPORT ON THE TWELFTH IAEA ON-SITE INSPECTION IN IRAQ
UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 687 (1991)

26 May - 4 June 1992

SALIENT POINTS

- The destruction of key technical installations and equipment at the Al Atheer-Al Hatteen site, begun during the eleventh IAEA inspection mission to Iraq, was completed in the course of the twelfth mission. Three more buildings, with a combined surface area of approximately 11 000 square meters, and the remaining equipment items were destroyed.
- At the request of the inspection team, the Iraqi side has begun preparations for the destruction of selected buildings at the Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat EMIS sites. Related actions associated with the dismantling of utilities and ventilation systems and the reduction in delivered electrical power to the sites are also under way. Progress was monitored throughout the inspection mission. More than 50% of the necessary work has been done. The actions will be finished during the next mission.
- As was the case at the Al Atheer-Al Hatteen site, the Iraqi side is providing all equipment, materials and manpower necessary for the efficient fulfillment of the destruction plan under the supervision of the inspection teams.
- Despite repeated requests for information by inspection teams, the Iraqi side has implemented a government decision not to identify the suppliers of the maraging steel, the carbon fibre centrifuge tubes and technical advice regarding centrifuge technology. This "grey area" will persist as the IAEA Action Team continues to seek this information through other avenues.

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- The work to identify the machine tools and better understand the overall capabilities existing in facilities declared by the Iraqi side to have been involved in the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission programme was completed. The purpose was directly related to establishing the basis for the longer-term monitoring programme.
- The amount of undeclared nuclear material processed in a safeguarded fuel fabrication facility, in violation of the safeguards agreement between Iraq and the IAEA, has been revised upward by the Iraqi side from 19 kilograms to approximately 60 kilograms of natural uranium dioxide. This non-compliance with the safeguards agreement was first communicated to the IAEA Board of Governors in July and August 1991.
- The last quantity (473 grams U235) of fresh highly enriched uranium fuel remaining in Iraq was removed by the twelfth inspection team.
- Through written questions, meetings and interviews, some clarification of issues related to Iraqi work on weaponization and uranium enrichment and to Iraqi nuclear material declarations was obtained. Open issues related to the centrifuge enrichment programme and the extent of the chemical enrichment work remain.
- The Iraqi side's co-operation in implementing destruction plans at Al Atheer-Al Hatteen, Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat cannot be faulted and should be noted. However, in the course of the twelfth mission there was a definite stiffening in the Iraqi attitude to working with the inspection team. There were numerous attempts to prohibit or limit the taking of photographs and the placing of seals. Meetings, transportation and other activities were often slow to be organized. The Iraqi explanation was that the active co-operation extended during previous inspections had not resulted in an improvement in the sanctions situation.

INTRODUCTION

1. This report summarizes the findings of the twelfth inspection mission carried out by the IAEA under United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 687 (1991) with the assistance and co-operation of the Special Commission of the United Nations. The mission took place from 26 May to 4 June 1992 and was headed by Mr. Demetrius Perricos of the IAEA as Chief Inspector. The team consisted of 21 inspectors and 6 supporting staff; it comprised 17 nationalities.

The objectives of the inspection mission were broadly

- to supervise the completion of the destruction of key technical installations comprising buildings and equipment at the Al Atheer-Al Hatteen site.
- to supervise the destruction of key technical installations at the Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat sites.
- to clarify issues arising from nuclear material accountancy questions and to visit related facilities.
- to further investigate the work done in enrichment, particularly in the areas of centrifuge and gaseous diffusion methods, and to assess procurement data in the centrifuge area.
- to assess the Iraqi answers to questions related to experiments and studies in the area of weaponization and to inspect related facilities.
- to continue field activities related to the identification and cataloguing of equipment used or capable of use in Iraq's nuclear programme.
- to remove from Iraq the remaining quantity (473 grams) of fresh highly enriched uranium.

These objectives were assigned to three groups within the overall team, with a group leader responsible for co-ordinating the work of each group. A total of 23 facilities and sites were inspected. These are shown in Table 1. All of these facilities and sites had been inspected previously by an IAEA team.

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Table 1

**List of facilities and sites inspected
during the twelfth inspection mission**

1. Tuwaittha site and associated locations (Locations A, B, C, Ash Shakyll storage, Al Nafad storage)
2. Tarmiya site
3. Al Atheer site
4. Al Qa Qaa site
5. Ash Sharqat site
6. Al Jesira site, including uranium waste location and equipment storage
7. Al Furat project site
8. State Enterprise for Heavy Engineering Equipment (Daura)
9. Badr General Establishment
10. Auqba Bin Nafi State Establishment
11. Al Radwan
12. Al Ameer
13. Nassr Establishment (Taji)
14. Saladdine Establishment (SAAD-13)
15. Al Dijila site
16. Saddam State Establishment
17. Dhu Al Fiqar Establishment
18. National Computer Centre, Baghdad
19. Iskandariyah State Enterprise for Mechanical Industries
20. Al Qaim site
21. Geological Survey Institute, Baghdad
22. Al Hadre explosive test site
23. Nassariya Ur Establishment

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SUMMARY

2. The Al Atheer-Al Hatteen complex, located approximately seventy kilometers south-west of Baghdad, has been identified by the IAEA as the site where Iraq had planned to locate its nuclear weapons development effort. The destruction of key technical installations and equipment at the Al Atheer-Al Hatteen site, begun during the eleventh IAEA inspection mission to Iraq, was concluded in the course of the twelfth mission.

Three large buildings (the carbide, powder and polymer buildings), with a combined surface of approximately 11 000 square meters, and two equipment items (large, hot and cold isostatic presses) were completely destroyed with explosive charges. Eight buildings, covering a surface of approximately 35 000 square meters, and equipment items that together constituted a major portion of the Al Atheer-Al Hatteen complex have now been destroyed.

As was the case in the eleventh mission, the Iraqi side provided all equipment, materials and manpower necessary for efficient implementation of the destruction plan under the supervision of the IAEA team.

3. A list of actions to be undertaken pursuant to UNSCR 687 with respect to the facilities at the Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat sites (see Annex 1) had been communicated to the Iraqi side on 15 May 1992. The Iraqi side responded with an energetic and well organized effort to carry out the required actions. The progress of the work at Tarmiya was inspected three times in the course of the twelfth mission. The work at Ash Sharqat was inspected twice. Overall, the work is more than 50% complete and the actions detailed in the 15 May 1992 letter, including the destruction of eight buildings (four at each site), will be concluded during the next mission.
4. The verification of Iraqi declarations regarding quantities of maraging steel and carbon fibre centrifuge rotors procured for Iraq's centrifuge programme and the identification of the source(s) of technical advice remain as open issues. A political decision by the Iraqi Government not to provide specific information on suppliers has been taken and formally communicated to UNSCOM. Resolution of these issues will be delayed while information is sought through Member States' Governments.

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5. The work to identify the machine tools and better understand the related capabilities existing in facilities declared by the Iraqi side to have been involved in the IAEA programme was completed. The purpose was directly related to establishing the basis for the longer-term monitoring programme. This work was a source of contention with the Iraqi side throughout the inspection. Attempts were made to limit the placing of identification seals on selected pieces of equipment and the taking of photographs. The Iraqi argument was that they believed that these activities were being carried out with the goal of destroying the industrial base of Iraq. The Iraqi side requested and received clarification from the IAEA Action Team regarding the intended use of the machine tool inventory (Annex 2).
6. In July and August 1991, the IAEA Board of Governors was informed of the non-compliance of Iraq with its obligations under the safeguards agreement concluded by Iraq with the Agency. Continuing work with the Iraqi side to resolve inconsistencies in Iraq's nuclear material declarations have resulted in revisions that indicate that amounts of unsafeguarded material processed in the safeguarded fuel fabrication facility had been understated by the Iraqi side. Specifically, the Iraqi authorities had stated that they had fabricated five fuel assemblies containing approximately 19 kilograms of natural uranium dioxide pellets. The revised declaration is that an additional 26 kilograms of natural uranium dioxide pellets and 14 kilograms of natural uranium dioxide pellets in fresh fuel rods had been fabricated using unsafeguarded material.
7. The last quantity (473 grams U235) of fresh highly enriched uranium fuel (93% plates and 36% pins) remaining in Iraq was removed by the twelfth inspection team. The removal from Iraq of the remaining 36 kilograms of U235 contained in the irradiated fuel elements of the Tamuz 2 and IRT 5000 research reactors is a major task still pending.

8. As has been the case throughout recent inspections, a number of meetings took place with the Iraqi side to clarify issues related to Iraqi work on weaponization and uranium enrichment and Iraq's nuclear material declarations. In general terms, a more consistent picture as regards the work on weaponization and gas diffusion enrichment technology has emerged. Some inconsistencies in the Iraqi nuclear material declarations were resolved, but the Iraqi side indicated its unwillingness to meet further on this subject and requested that all further questions be put in writing. Open issues relating to the centrifuge enrichment programme and the extent of the chemical enrichment work remain.
9. The long awaited "full, final and complete" declaration from the Iraqi side regarding all activities involving weapons of mass destruction covered by UNSCR 687 was delivered on 4 June. A copy of the nuclear portion is currently being translated. No judgement can yet be made regarding the completeness and accuracy of the report.
10. A full record of the correspondence between the Chief Inspector of the twelfth inspection team and the Iraqi counterpart is given in Annex 3.


DESTRUCTION OF KEY TECHNICAL INSTALLATIONS AND EQUIPMENT

11. The destruction of buildings and equipment at the Al Atheer-Al Hatteen site specified in a communication transmitted to the Iraqi authorities on 25 March 1992 has been completed. The destruction of three major buildings (the carbide, powder and polymer buildings) and of remaining equipment items (the hot and cold isostatic presses) and the removal of the protective berm from around the Building 33 firing site were observed during the twelfth inspection.
12. The status as of 4 June 1992 is given below. A line drawing of the Al Atheer-Al Hatteen site is provided in Figure 1.
 1. Building 33 - The high explosives test bunker was destroyed by filling it with concrete and scrap metal. The protective berm has been removed.

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Figure 1

AL-ATHEER



2. Building 18 - Explosion chamber destroyed with cutting torch.
3. Building 19 - Control building destroyed by explosives.
4. Building 21 - Physics building destroyed by explosives. Cell foundation destroyed with cutting torch.
5. Building 50 - Casting building destroyed by explosives.
6. Building 55 - Carbide building destroyed by explosives.
7. Building 82 - Powder building destroyed by explosives.
8. Building 84 - Polymer building destroyed by explosives.

The combined surface area of the eight destroyed buildings was approximately 35 000 square meters. An updated list of destroyed equipment is given in Table 2. The hot and cold isostatic presses were destroyed with explosives. The destruction of specified ventilation and process equipment left in the buildings was verified by the inspection team.

As has been stated previously, the Iraqi side provided all equipment, materials and manpower necessary for efficient implementation of the destruction plan. The actual destruction of buildings and equipment took place under the supervision of the inspection team.

13. A list of actions to be undertaken pursuant to UNSCR 687 with respect to the facilities at the Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat EMIS sites (see Annex 1) had been communicated to the Iraqi authorities on 15 May 1992. The Iraqi side responded with a large and well organized effort to carry out the required actions. The progress of work at both sites was monitored in the course of the inspection mission. The work is more than 50% complete. The actions detailed in the 15 May 1992 letter, including the destruction of eight buildings (four at each site), will be completed during the next mission.

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Table 2

**List of type of equipment destroyed
at the Al Atheer-Al Hatteen Site**

Equipment	Manufacturer	Status
Large cold isostatic press	ASEA-Brown Boveri	Completed
Large hot isostatic press and two associated furnaces	ASEA-Brown Boveri	Completed
Cold isostatic press	ABRA	Completed
Hot isostatic press	ABRA	Completed
Resistance furnaces	Pfeiffer	Completed
Induction furnace	Pfeiffer	Completed
Vacuum furnaces	Pfeiffer	Completed
Vacuum plasma spray system	Plasmatechnik	Completed
Atmospheric plasma spray system	Plasmatechnik	Completed
Precision turning machine	Schäublin	Completed
Superprecision lathe	Hardinge Brothers	Completed
Jig grinding machine	Waida	Completed
3-axis coordinate measuring machine	Leitz	Some key components removed by IAEA; manufacturer has confirmed that this equipment is rendered harmless
Viewing windows for high explosives test bunker	not determined	Completed

14. The Tarmiya site was inspected three times in the course of the twelfth mission. The purpose was to monitor the preparations being made by the Iraqi side to meet the requirements of the 15 May 1992 letter. The work force at Tarmiya consisted of some 700 people on an around-the-clock basis. The situation as it existed on 4 June 1992 vis-à-vis the various requirements is summarized below:

- The electric substation serving the site is part of the national grid. It serves a number of local users in addition to the Tarmiya site. Representatives from the site worked with technical people from the State Electric Establishment to develop a proposal for reducing the delivered power to the site by an order of magnitude. The proposal was delivered to the inspection team on the last day of the inspection and is currently being evaluated.
- The horizontal return iron installed in Building 33 has been completely removed. There is a total of 51 identical pieces (~30 tonnes each). They are currently in front of the building, and will later be moved to a nearby open storage area (named Al Nafad II).
- All transformers and switchgear have been removed from Buildings 5, 38 and 243 to nearby storage areas. About 50% of the electrical cable connecting Buildings 5 and 38 to Building 33 and Building 243 to Building 245 has been removed.
- The equipment installed in the Building 248 (general utilities) is essentially disassembled. Connecting flanges for the main pumps have been removed. The equipment will be stored in situ.
- At the request of the inspection team, the Iraqi side had concentrated a large effort on preparing Building 245 for destruction. The work was more than 50% complete by the conclusion of the inspection.

All preparations will be completed prior to the next inspection, scheduled for mid-July. Buildings 5, 38, 243 and 245 will be destroyed during that inspection. With the

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exception of Building 245, all buildings in the main process area (particularly Building 33) were damaged during the war. All high-efficiency particulate air filters (HEPAs) and activated charcoal filter elements from the high-efficiency exhaust air filtration units installed in chemistry Buildings 46, 57 and 225 have been removed and inventoried and are awaiting destruction as requested by the twelfth inspection team.

15. The Ash Sharqat facility was severely damaged during the war. This, together with Iraqi salvage efforts that had begun prior to the first inspection of the site in July 1991, has resulted in a situation where the work necessary to meet the requirements of the 15 May 1992 letter is much less here than at Tarmiya. The status as of 3 June 1992 is summarized below:

- The substation serving the Ash Sharqat site has been completely dismantled. All that remains are two badly damaged step-down transformers.
- Rubble has been removed from Building 51 to the extent necessary for the inspection team to confirm previous judgements that no horizontal return iron had ever been installed there.
- All transformers and switchgear have long since been removed from Buildings 27, 29 and 20. Approximately 90% of the electric cable connecting Buildings 27 and 29 to Building 51 and Building 20 to Building 21 has been removed.
- The general utilities in Building 31 had been dismantled during the period between the third and seventh inspection missions (July-October 1991). Most of the equipment is sitting in a nearby open storage area.
- Building 21 was damaged during the war, but the basic structure is still intact. Preparations to complete the destruction of this building are nearly complete.

As is the case for Tarmiya, all preparations at Ash Sharqat will be completed prior to the next inspection mission. The destruction of Buildings 27, 29, 20 and 21 will be completed at that time. A portion of the high-efficiency exhaust air filtration systems in the chemistry buildings had been installed. Action that parallels that to be carried out at Tarmiya has been initiated.

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ACTIVITIES RELATED TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL

16. In the report on the eleventh inspection mission, an evaluation of the changes in the nuclear material balance included in Iraq's "final and revised chart" received by the IAEA in Vienna on 22 April 1992 was presented. In that report, the differences between declared and verified amounts and categories of nuclear material were identified. One of the objectives of the twelfth team was to clarify these differences. The Iraqi side indicated that it was not willing to discuss any differences further and that its "final and revised chart" was to be regarded as its final declaration. After several meetings, however, changes were made; they are reflected in the chart included in the "full, final and complete" report (Figure 2). The changes are summarized below. The declarations regarding the processing of material in the Building 73 complex are presented in detail because of the connection with the statements of Iraq's non-compliance with the safeguards agreement made to the IAEA Board of Governors in July and August 1991.

- The amounts of EMIS solutions produced at Al Tuwaitha and presented to the IAEA were modified so as to be in agreement with those declared in the letter of 31 May 1992 from the Iraqi counterpart to the Chief Inspector of the twelfth IAEA team. The changes related to the amounts of enriched and depleted uranium, but the 782 grams of natural uranium declared in the above-mentioned declaration were not included in the revised chart.
- The processes involved and the nuclear material produced in Building 73 in Tuwaitha (Figure 3) have been redistributed. In the "final and revised chart" of 22 April 1992, the nuclear material processed in the Building 73 complex was divided into two categories, one corresponding to material of Italian origin which was under safeguards and the other to material which was not under safeguards: 9.1 tonnes of natural uranium and UO_4 from Al Qaim, 375.2 kilograms of natural uranium and UO_2 from Al Jesira and 220 kilograms of natural uranium (as UO_2) from Brazil.

During the twelfth inspection mission, the Iraqi side explained that "Building 73" referred to a complex of buildings (see Figure 4). Of this complex, Buildings

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73A and 73B were under safeguards. In addition, the Iraqi side declared that the activities involving the unsafeguarded material had taken place in Building 73C except for the production of 18.9 kilograms of natural uranium as five fuel elements, of 26 kilograms of natural uranium as pellets and of 14 kilograms of natural uranium as 46 fresh fuel pins; these had been produced in Building 73A using UO_2 from Al Jesira. The production of the five fuel elements, their irradiation in the IRT 5000 reactor and the reprocessing of three of them had been previously declared and the corresponding non-compliance with the safeguards agreement between Iraq and the IAEA communicated to the IAEA Board of Governors. Figure 5 includes the processes declared as having taken place in Building 73C. Building 73C had been declared in the past as containing only utilities and a mechanical workshop (including the electron beam welder).

- The Iraqi side indicated that no filtration system had been installed in Building 73C. Thirty-seven filters containing 50 kilograms of natural uranium as UO_4 were declared as belonging to Building 73B and the nuclear material present in them as being of Italian - instead of Al Qaim - origin. Additional samples have been taken with a view to clarifying this matter.
17. Several questions about remaining inconsistencies (see Table A4-1) in the Iraqi nuclear material flow chart were put to the Iraqi side in writing. The Iraqi side's response was that "any differences in weights existing in the chart of nuclear material as verified by the Agency are attributed to either losses of the material during the bombing or mixing of the material during the evacuation or the inaccuracy of the analysis of the samples". According to the statements of the Iraqi side, it considers that the "nuclear material file is closed".
18. Other nuclear-material-related inspection activities carried out during the twelfth IAEA inspection mission were:
- Inspection and sampling of the waste tanks belonging to the Building 73 complex. There is a rectangular concrete tank beside the complex. Inside this concrete tank there is a cylindrical steel tank with a capacity of approximately

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Figure 2

Nuclear material flow chart as included in the "full, final and complete" report




Figure 3

Tuwaittha Nuclear Research Centre



Figure 4

Layout of the Building 73 complex presented
by the Iraqi authorities





Figure 5

Layout of Building 73C as presented by the
Iraqi authorities

30th July Project / Buliding 73 C



Utilities
for
30th July
Project

1. Dissolution
2. Adjustment and Precipitation.
3. Filteration
4. Drying
5. Calcination and Reduction
6. UF4 preparation and filtration
7. UF4 preparation and filtration
8. Crushing and preparation of UF4 powder
9. Mixing UF4 with Mg and preparation of charge
10. Bomb shell preparation
11. Metal Recovery
12. Reduction Furnace
13. Reserach and development of U metal purification

7m³. The Iraqi side declared that the content of the steel tank belongs to Buildings 73A and B and that the content of the concrete tank belongs to Building 73C. Samples were taken from both tanks to confirm the declared origins and the amounts of uranium contained in them.

- EMIS solutions containing highly-enriched uranium produced in Al Tuwalitha Building 80 was diluted using nuclear material of Brazilian origin. The dilution was performed in order to downgrade the highly-enriched uranium present in the solutions to low-enriched uranium.
- The remaining unirradiated highly enriched uranium was removed from Iraq. It included 14.5 pins of 36%-enriched uranium (332.6 grams uranium, 116.1 grams U235) and 23 plates of 93%-enriched uranium (383 grams uranium, 356.5 grams U235).
- A drum containing 163 grams of enriched uranium (5.8%) in solution form (145 litres) was moved from Tarmiya to location C and placed under IAEA seal. The remaining low-enriched uranium and depleted uranium solutions are still in Tarmiya.
- The nuclear material stored at location C has been reconfigured in line with new Iraqi declarations (see Figures A4-1 and A4-2). Monitoring activities (seals check and item counting) were carried out on the irradiated fuel located in the IRT 5000 reactor and in the tanks at location B.

A complete summary of the declared amounts and the corresponding verification results for nuclear material stored at locations B and C and in the IRT 5000 reactor are presented in Annex 4.

ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE ENRICHMENT PROGRAMME

19. On the last day of the eleventh inspection mission a meeting was arranged with the Chairman of the IAEC to discuss the Iraqi position that the suppliers of the maraging steel, carbon fibre rotor tubes and technical advice (centrifuge technology) would not be disclosed. The Chairman indicated that the matter was being discussed at the highest levels of the Iraqi Government and requested that the inspection team regard

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it as an "open issue" that would be resolved during the next inspection mission. At a meeting held early during the twelfth mission, the Iraqi side described a political decision of the Government not to provide specific information on suppliers. The decision reflected inter alia "a position based on moral grounds which Iraq is not prepared to abandon". The necessary information continues to be sought through other sources, and in the meantime these aspects of the Iraqi centrifuge programme remain open issues.

20. A list of questions calling for additional details about various aspects of the Iraqi enrichment programme was given to the Iraqi side on the first day of the inspection mission. These questions were discussed and further clarifications offered during subsequent meetings. A written response to the questions, although often promised, was not received. In several instances the Iraqi side referred the team to the "full, final and complete" report as containing the requested information. Throughout the discussions, the Iraqi side took the position that Iraq's enrichment programme had been fully disclosed and that the inspection team's efforts to obtain additional details were a form of harassment that would not add to the overall assessment.
21. Nevertheless, in spite of the above, a number of meetings between Iraqi technical experts and uranium enrichment experts from the inspection team did result in an improved understanding of Iraqi efforts in both centrifuge and gaseous diffusion. Detailed technical statements regarding such things as the method used to assemble the extraction system, the effect of the choice of wall velocity on the overall centrifuge design and the method of manufacturing the bottom bearing cup were credible and further convinced the team that the Iraqi side had received significant advice from abroad. Similarly, the Iraqi experts' description of their attempts to develop gaseous diffusion barrier was technically credible and consistent with information contained in the PC-3 reports.

22. The Iraqi side responded to a number of written questions regarding weaponization issues. The information is still being analyzed, but the answers appear to be consistent with previous declarations, seized documentary evidence and direct inspection results. More than before, the Iraqi side seems anxious to end this process.
23. A follow-up inspection was conducted at the Al Qa Qaa facility, south of Baghdad. The Iraqi side had presented to the eleventh team a die set declared to have been used for pressing high explosive lenses. However, further evaluation suggested that this die set could not have been used to produce the described high explosive components. Iraqi engineers met with the twelfth inspection team and provided a detailed description of a manufacturing process that appears consistent with both the declared components and the observed equipment. The team went on to inspect two areas consisting of small-scale testing and research buildings. One area contains a number of test facilities that could be adapted to machining and manufacturing. The other area was declared to be a quality control facility serving the whole Al Qa Qaa high explosive component manufacture operation. Construction is still under way. Al Qa Qaa's role in the weapons development programme appears to have been that of a service organization. The inspection process has not identified a facility uniquely associated with the Iraqi nuclear programme.
24. Buildings 66 and 73C at Tuwailtha were again inspected as a result of changed Iraqi declarations regarding the location of uranium metallurgy work and detonator development tests. Both buildings were badly damaged during the war and by subsequent cleanup operations. They have continued to deteriorate since then. Little can be done to verify the Iraqi declarations that Building 73C was the location of the uranium metal production (approximately one tonne) and that Building 66 had been planned for this activity in the future. Building 66 was declared as the location of the detonator development work. Samples taken from waste tanks adjacent to Building 73C may provide some clues. Both buildings lack the appropriate filtered ventilation systems for long-term work with uranium metal.
25. The Al Hadre munitions testing site, first inspected in October 1991 by the seventh inspection team, was visited again by the twelfth team. The judgement that the site is convertible to nuclear hydrodynamic testing was confirmed. The facility has not been used, and the war damage observed during the October visit has not been repaired.

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ACTIVITIES RELATED TO EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS

26. The team visited the Nassr State Establishment (Taji), the State Enterprise for Heavy Engineering Equipment (Daura), the Badr General Establishment, Al Ameen, the Al Ameer and Al Radwan factories of the Auqba bin Nafi Establishment, the Saddam State Establishment (Al Ameer) and the Saladdine State Establishment to inventory machine tools and other relevant equipment. With these visits, the inventory of machine tools at facilities related to the nuclear programme declared in July 1991 has been completed. The current inventory of machine tools is shown in Table 3. According to the declaration, the involvement of some of these facilities in the nuclear programme was only slight. Key machines are those which have technical characteristics required for producing key components needed in a nuclear programme. Key machines have been identified (to the extent possible) by type, serial number and manufacturer, and in some cases an IAEA seal has been applied for identification purposes (see Annex 2). Such key machines include high-precision milling and turning machines (Schäublin, Matrix Churchill), large turning and milling machines (SHW, Zayer, Innocenti, Dorries, Schiess Froriep), turning and milling machines with special fixtures (MAHO, Magdeburg), jig bores (SIP), and flow forming machines (H & H Metallform). Key machines include also electron beam welders (Leybold, Heraeus, Sciaky) and precision measurement machines (Leitz, DEA). The Iraqi side attempted to limit the placing of identifying seals and the taking of photographs on numerous occasions throughout these inspections.
27. The team inspected the Ash Shaykhili warehouses of the Ministry of Industry to identify, photograph and inventory. The items of interest included those brought back by the 93-truck convoy during the third IAEA inspection mission. Additional items of interest were discovered during this inspection. They included ten pieces of small EMIS discs (880 mm pole diameter) which probably belonged to the R-24 experiment, a small EMIS coil winding machine for these discs, and two large vacuum valves. The Iraqi side promised to move items of interest to the area of warehouse 13B at Ash Shaykhili, where there are other items under IAEA control. The remaining equipment was judged to be of general use and was released.

28. The team visited the Ur State Establishment (Nassariya), where melted aluminium components of centrifuge housings are stored. Material which had been presented to the tenth IAEA team, was declared to contain 84 tons of aluminium tubing for centrifuge molecular pumps and 300 tons of aluminium tubing for centrifuge housings. These have been melted together into large blocks; according to Iraqi declarations, it was done prior to the start of UNSCR 687 inspections. During the tenth IAEA inspection mission, the total weight was estimated and samples were taken. The twelfth IAEA team took additional samples (total 15) to confirm the analytical results. It found partially melted blocks which were sampled selectively. The tenth IAEA team was presented with a batch of smaller blocks, which was declared to contain the melted remains of aluminium forgings for 9000 upper flanges, 9000 jacket rings and 200-250 disk-shaped lower flanges. The total weight of 126 tons had been confirmed by the tenth team. An intact top flange from a poorly melted block was removed. The twelfth team took five additional samples for chemical analysis. In some poorly melted blocks, identification marks and components were detected which could be of help in confirming manufacturer information.
29. The team revisited the Iskandariya foundry to take additional samples from the maraging steel blocks, which again, according to Iraqi declarations, had been melted unilaterally by Iraq prior to the start of UNSCR 687 inspections. During the eleventh IAEA inspection mission, two blocks of maraging steel were rendered harmless by remelting with an equal amount of scrap carbon steel. The analytical results indicate that this action renders the material harmless. The Iraqi side has located a foundry in Basra which is capable of completing the destruction in a few days. This activity will therefore be completed during a future mission.

TABLE 3

**UPDATED LIST OF IDENTIFIED EQUIPMENT - BASED
ON RESULTS OF THE TWELFTH INSPECTION MISSION**

Type of Machine	Total	Key Machines
Milling, 5 axes	32	32
Milling, 4 axes	62	0
Milling, 3 axes	214	10
Turning	148	71
Grinding	21	0
Jig grinding	8	0
Jig boring	7	3
Electric discharge, RAM or wire type	15	0
Precision measurement	16	3
Cutting	7	0
Boring	4	0
Electron beam welding	5	5
Flow or spin forming	16	14
Press	16	0
TOTAL	571	138

OTHER ACTIVITIES

30. Inspection at Al Qaim - Al Qaim, located about 300 kilometers north-west of Baghdad, near the Syrian border, is the site of a yellow cake (UO_4) production facility co-located with a very large superphosphate fertilizer plant. This plant was badly damaged during the Gulf War. The yellow cake facility was particularly hard hit. Portions of the fertilizer plant have been repaired. The yellow cake facility remains in the condition it was in when first inspected, in July 1991, by the third IAEA inspection team. The team was given a complete description of the construction history (including contractors), processes and operational history of the plant.

The yellow cake facility is located within the site boundary in a separately secured area. Construction began in 1982. The design capacity was 103 tonnes/year, the second cycle and refinery sections being built with an overcapacity of 100%. The capacity is based on a feed concentration of 75ppm and a minimum recovery rate of 93%. The plant was planned for commissioning in the first half of 1984. Operating records show that 20 514 kilograms of UO_4 had been produced by 1 October 1984. The team was presented with daily production records. Copies of the records have been requested for review at Tuwaitha.

31. Inspection at the Geological Survey Institute, Baghdad - This is the location of process development and pilot plant operation intended to recover uranium (as UO_4) from carbonate ore from the Abou-Sukhair mine. The team received a complete description of the process. The pilot plant was completed in June 1990 and 20 tonnes of ore were received from Abou-Sukhair in July 1990. Ten tonnes were processed, producing 500 grams of UO_4 , and the remaining 10 tonnes was sent back to the mine. The processing capacity of the plant was 200 kilograms of ore per hour. At present the plant is being used for aluminium extraction. Equipment located at the Institute was inspected by the fifth IAEA inspection team.
32. Follow-up inspection at Al Jesira - The transfer of uranium waste from the oil tank to the open-air settling tanks at Al Jesira, begun during the tenth mission, is complete. It is expected that the solutions will evaporate during the summer; the solid deposit will

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then be collected into drums and transferred to location C at Tuwaittha. The team performed a seal check on the equipment items stored in an open area adjacent to the facility. The search for additional manufacturer information was not successful.

33. Follow-up inspections were carried out at Al Furat, Dijila and the National Computer Centre (NEC-750) during the twelfth inspection mission. A second and again unsuccessful attempt was made to operate the NEC-750 computer.
34. The second version of the Iraqi "full, final and complete" report (dated May 1992) regarding all activities relating to weapons of mass destruction covered by UNSCR 687 (the Iraqi Nuclear Programme Before and After UNSCR 687 (1991)), was provided on 4 June for onward transmission. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs - Mr. Al-Sahaf - requested in the covering letter that the report be treated as confidential because of the nature of the contents. The nuclear portion of the report is currently being translated. No judgement can yet be made regarding the completeness and accuracy of the report.

ANNEX 1

Actions required regarding Tarmiya/Ash Sharqat sites

The actions identified below apply to both sites and should be undertaken only in the presence of the IAEA inspection team.

Requested actions:

- (1) Reduce delivered electrical power to the Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat sites by approximately an order of magnitude. Proposals are expected from the Iraqi side on how this could be done such that (i) It can be monitored, and (ii) has minimum impact on other users in the area).
- (2) Remove the 1200mm system horizontal return iron from Building 33, Tarmiya and Building 51, Ash Sharqat to the Al Nafad storage area.
- (3) Remove the electrical cables connecting Buildings 5 and 38 to Building 33, Tarmiya; Buildings 27 and 29 to Building 51, Ash Sharqat; Building 243 to Building 245, Tarmiya; and Building 20 to Building 21, Ash Sharqat.
- (4) Dismantle and remove the general utilities infrastructure from Buildings 243, Tarmiya and 31, Ash Sharqat.
- (5) Buildings 5, 38, 243, 245 - Tarmiya and Buildings 27, 29, 20, 21 - Ash Sharqat are to be destroyed.
- (6) Building 33, Tarmiya and Building 51, Ash Sharqat are not to be re-built.

Equipment and other useable materials, with the exception of the ventilation systems in Building 245, Tarmiya and Building 21, Ash Sharqat, may be salvaged, but should be stored at the site for inspection prior to removal.


Additional actions covering equipment at either or both sites may be required.

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Tarmiya



Ash Sharqat





INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
AGENCE INTERNATIONALE DE L'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE
МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ АГЕНТСТВО ПО АТОМНОЙ ЭНЕРГИИ
ORGANISMO INTERNACIONAL DE ENERGIA ATOMICA

WAGRAMERSTRASSE 5, P.O. BOX 100, A-1400 VIENNA, AUSTRIA
TELEX: 1-12645, CABLE: INATOM VIENNA, FACSIMILE: 43 1 234564, TELEPHONE: 43 1 2360

IN REPLY PLEASE REFER TO:
PRIERE DE RAPPELER LA REFERENCE

EMAIL DIRECTLY TO EXTENSION
COMPOSER DIRECTEMENT LE NUMERO DE POSTE

ANNEX 2

1 June 1992

Dear Dr. Al Hajjaj,

1. The Chief Inspector of IAEA-12 informed me that you request clarification as to the purpose of the current inventorying/seals application activity on certain equipment and machine tools located at different facilities.
2. As communicated to you by the Chief Inspector, these measures are chiefly meant to facilitate the identification of items, particularly those associated with the implementation of the long-term monitoring plan, and save time in subsequent inspections.
3. In more general terms, the application of seals does not prejudice the final disposal of the item in question, i.e., the decision to release the sealed items for general use under the long-term monitoring plan or to destroy, remove or render harmless the item in question, under UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991).
4. Items which are prohibited under UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991) are identified for destruction, removal or rendering harmless. The application of seals to such items found in Iraqi facilities is to prevent their use or movement prior to their destruction, removal or rendering harmless, as appropriate.
5. Dual-use items, for which there is no evidence of use in activities prohibited under UN Security Council resolution 687 (1991), are sealed for identification and will be considered for release under the long-term monitoring plan, or allowed to be used pending the implementation of such a plan. The definition of dual-use items, the procedure for release and the modalities of the long-term plan are established in UN Security Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991).
6. Hence, acceptance of these resolutions by the Iraqi authorities and full compliance with their provisions will greatly facilitate the orderly processing of requests for re-use of facilities and equipment, including machine tools and materials.

Sincerely,

Maurizio Zifferero
Leader
UNSC 687 Action Team

Dr. Al Hajjaj
Directorate for International Organizations
Baghdad

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ANNEX 3

S/24223
English
Page 33

List of Documents Received or Sent

- 12-01 Mr. Zifferero to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920515 regarding actions to be taken for the destruction of buildings and equipment at Al Atheer/Al Hatteen complex, Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat
- 12-02 Mr. Muhammad Said Al-Sahaf, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. R. Ekeus, Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, on 920524 stating among other things the reasons for not providing procurement information related to the Iraqi centrifuge programme.
- 12-03 Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 920527 providing a response to questions concerning the plutonium line asked on 920414 (IAEA-11)
- 12-04 Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 920527 providing a response to questions regarding Al-Rabee and Al Dijila factories, centrifuge programme and weaponization asked on 920414 (IAEA-11)
- 12-05 Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920527 clarifying the purpose of attaching IAEA seals to equipment.
- 12-06 Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920527 reminding the Iraqi side that there were still open questions - such as the procurement of carbon fibre rotors and maraging steel and source(s) of technical advice on the centrifuge programme - and asking for additional information on EMIS 1200-mm iron cores, light metal collectors used for EMIS, properties and current location of some HV DC power supply cabinets for EMIS, identification of gaseous diffusion projects 304 and 305 (including siting information on various gaseous diffusion projects), location of frequency converters, list and sources of imported chemical enrichment equipment, installation diagram for Building 90 at Al Tuwaiha, purpose of "paper plant", and locations of Khairat collection and Al Khayrat assembly points.
- 12-07 Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920528 clarifying the criteria and specifications on the basis of which machine tools would be considered by the IAEA inspection team to be key equipment and have IAEA seals applied to them.
- 12-08 Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 910528 asking for clarifications regarding nuclear material balance and production at Abu Sukhair, Al Qaim and Al Jesira, processing of material of Brazilian origin, UCl_4 production in Building 85 at Tuwaiha, inconsistencies in U235 and U236 content of some samples, discrepancies in depleted uranium and enriched uranium recovered from the EMIS programme at Tuwaiha, and exact location and description of flows and dates of various activities performed in building complex 73 at Tuwaiha.
- 12-09 Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920530 asking for clarifications and additional information on IAEC/PC-3 projects, code names and PC-3 organization chart.
- 12-10 Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920530 requesting a special meeting on the activities performed in Building 73 "30 July project" at Tuwaiha.

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- 12-11 Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920531 asking for explanations regarding the Iraqi nuclear material flow chart sent to IAEA on 920422, the activities in Building 73 at Tuwaitha and the origin of materials in a batch of ADU.
- 12-12 Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920601 confirming the removal of MTR fuel plates containing 93% and pins containing 36% enriched uranium.
- 12-13 Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920601 requesting presentation of the daily production records of the yellow cake plant at Al Qaim.
- 12-14 Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920602 asking for information on the feasibility studies on underground nuclear reactors, including siting studies, type(s) of reactor, and procurement information related to reactors and reprocessing.
- 12-15 Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Zifferero on 920602 providing information on the planned use of some radioisotopes in Iraq.
- 12-16 Mr. Zifferero to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920601 clarifying the purpose of the inventorying/seals application activities involving certain equipment and machine tools.
- 12-17 Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 920602, in response to the request of 920528 (item 12-08 above), providing information on the production at Abou-Sukhair mine, Al Qaim and Al Jesira and discrepancies observed by the inspection teams.
- 12-18 Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 920528, in response to the request made by IAEA-11 on 920407, providing information on the inventory of nuclear material mentioned in an Al Atheer plan progress report, deliveries from Akashat/Al Qaim to Tuwaitha and Al Jesira, materials lost during bombing, shipments of UO_2 from Brazil, and EMIS washing solutions.
- 12-19 Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920604 regarding the destruction activities at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat and requesting the destruction of high-efficiency and activated charcoal filters and actions to be taken with regard to filter housings during IAEA-13.
- 12-20 Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920604 agreeing to the removal and demolition of the two hot cells in Building 15 at Tuwaitha and requesting the presentation of manipulators, leaded glass windows etc. to the IAEA-13 team.
- 12-21 Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920604 agreeing to release the general-purpose equipment and utilities stripped from the destroyed buildings at Al Atheer/Al Hatteen site and the destroyed equipment (IAEA-12).
- 12-22 Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920604 requesting the presentation of missing parts (such as power supply, control unit, mandrels and rollers) of a flow forming machine inspected by the team at Iskandariya on 920601.

- 12-23 Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920604 asking about the original purpose of the design workshop, the designer and the intended user, and requesting information on the contracts of Dijila with foreign firms.
- 12-24 Mr. Perricos to Mr. Al Hajjaj on 920604 reminding the Iraqi side about the remaining open questions relating to the hydrodynamic codes and NEC 750 computer used in the weaponization studies.
- 12-25 Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 920604 providing some information on the studies and experiments related to weaponization.
- 12-26 Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 920604 providing a list of UO_2 shipments received from Brazil in 1981.
- 12-27 Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 920604 regarding proposals to retain two generators in Building 243 at Tarmiya, and tasks and power requirements for Tarmiya site.
- 12-29 Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Zifferero on 920603 reminding the Iraqi side that the irradiated fuel, which has not yet been removed from Iraq, is causing a potential environmental hazard.
- 12-30 Mr. Al Hajjaj to Mr. Perricos on 920603 providing two additional diskettes containing codes and data used by Group IV of PC-3.

ANNEX 4

Tables A4-1, A4-2 and A4-3 provide a complete description of the nuclear materials and the declared and verified inventories stored at location C, location B and the IRT 5000 reactor respectively. Figures A4-1 and A4-2 give a description of the physical configuration of the nuclear material stored at location C.

SUMMARY OF INSPECTION RESULTS

12th On-Site Inspection

Table 1

Location C

ORIGIN	Processing Site	Material Type	Presented to Team No.	DECLARED INVENTORY			VERIFIED INVENTORY									
				No. of Items	Compound Weight (kg)	Element Weight (kg)	U _{iso} (kg)	No. of Items	Compound Weight (kg)	Element Weight (kg)	U _{iso} (kg)	Verification Activities				
Niger	-	Yellow Cake	1,3,8	858	276844	199934	-	858	276844	199934	-	858	329	122	41	
	Portugal		1,3	916	286435	213016	-	916*	286435	213016	-	916	322	127	48	
Italy	Al Tuwaiha Bldg. 73 A & B	NU	UO ₂ Pellets	1	-	8	-	1	9,272	8,17	-	1	1	1	1	
			U ₃ O ₈ Powders	1,3	10	366,58	310,1	-	10	366,58	309,75	-	10	6	3	3
			UO ₂ Powders	1	22	721,43	631,2	-	22	721,43	624,54	-	22	18	7	3
		UO ₂ Powders	1	1	29,71	20,3	-	1	29,5	20,14	-	1	1	1	1	
		Mix U Oxides	1	6	166,77	135,2	-	6	166,77	135,51	-	6	6	3	2	
		FF Bundles	3	4	-	771	-	4	876,1	771	-	4	4	4	1	
		FF Rods	1,3	55	-	29,96	-	54**	33,82	29,42	-	54	4	54	-	
		UO ₂ in Filters	4	37	-	50	-	37	-	50	-	37	-	-	6	
		UO ₂ Powders	1	68	-	2253,6	-	68	2620,5	2253,6	-	68	68	14	10	
		UO ₂ Powders	1	75	-	1767	45,82	75	2031	1767	45,82	75	75	23	10	
		UO ₂ Powders	1	183	-	6005	-	183	7007	6005	-	183	183	16	7	
		U.K.	Al Tuwaiha Bldg. 9	DU	4	2	2	2	-	2	2	2	-	2	1	2
NU	4			4	-	0,4	-	4	0,54	0,4	-	4	1	1	-	

I = item counting, B = weight, D = sample analysis, NDA = non-destructive analysis
 LEU = Low Enriched Uranium, DU = Depleted Uranium, NU = Natural Uranium, FF = Fresh Fuel

* Drum #44H1 contains about 150 kgs Yellow Cake from Portugal and 217 kgs from Al Qaim origin and purified in Bldg. 73C (30 July Project)

** 1 FF Rod containing 0.54 kg NU was declared lost during bombing

Table 1 (cont. 1)

Location C

ORIGIN	Processing Site	Material Type	Presented to Team No.	DECLARED INVENTORY				VERIFIED INVENTORY									
				No. of Items	Compound Weight (kg)	Element Weight (kg)	U ₂₃₅ (kg)	No. of Items	Compound Weight (kg)	Element Weight (kg)	U ₂₃₅ (kg)	Verification Activities					
												I	NDA	B	D		
Brazil	-	UO ₂ Powders	3	201	-	20128	-	201	20731	18036	-	201	37	201	7		
		UF ₆	3	1	0.465	0.3	-	1	0.6	0.4	-	1	1	1	1		
		Liquid Waste	4	4	-	6	-	4	-	6	-	4	-	-	5		
		Mix U Powders	1,3,4	1	-	20	-	1	30	13.9	-	1	1	1	6		
		UF ₆ Powders		1	-	183	-	1	227	170.2	-	1	1	1	3		
		UO ₂ Powders		3	-	131.5	-	3	150.8	131.2	-	3	3	3	2		
		UCL ₄	3,4	33	-	1840	-	33	2996.1	1917	-	33	33	33	17		
		ADU Powders	3	13	-	717	-	13*	1140	545.04	-	13	13	13	15		
		EMIS Solutions	3	19	-	0.783	-	5**	-	0.393	-	5	5	5	3		
		-			0.322	0.050	-		0.278	0.044	5					5	10
-	2.438	-			1.716	-	6										
Denmark	-	EMIS Powders	10	8	0.398	0.318	0.021	8	0.411	0.308	0.020	8	8	8	8		
		DU	13	5.063	4.050	-	13	5.150	4.120	-	13	13	13	11			
		EU	3	1	-	0.146	0.009	1	-	0.163	0.010	1	1	1	5		
		FF Rod	1	1	-	0.080	0.002	1	-	0.080	0.002	1	1	1	-		

= item counting, B = weighing, D = sample analysis, NDA = non-destructive analysis

U = High Enrichment Uranium

I = item counting, B = weighing, D = sample analysis, NDA = non-destructive analysis
 HEU = High Enriched Uranium, LEU = Low Enriched Uranium, NU = Natural Uranium, EU = Enriched Uranium
 DU = Depleted Uranium, FF = Fresh Fuel

* Drum #1 among ADU from Al-Jefira (contains 95.8 kg NU) is a mixture of Brazilian and Akashat powder

** Since part of the solutions were HEU. All mixed to change category to LEU (~1% U-235)

/...

SUMMARY OF INSPECTION RESULTS

12th On-Site Inspection

Table 1 (cont.2)

Location C

ORIGIN	Processing Site	Material Type	Presented to Team No.	DECLARED INVENTORY				VERIFIED INVENTORY							
				No. of Items	Compound Weight (kg)	Element Weight (kg)	U ₂₃₅ (kg)	No. of Items	Compound Weight (kg)	Element Weight (kg)	U ₂₃₅ (kg)	Verification Activities			
USSR	IRT-5000	-	4	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-
	Al Qaim	Natural	3	12	-	2200	-	12	3008	2023	-	12	12	12	9
Akashat	Al Jemra	UO ₂ Powders	3	410	-	84843.2	-	410	97331	84680	-	410	308	98	47
		UCL ₄	3	8	1207	780	-	8	1156	747	-	8	8	8	1
		Retained Waste	3	-	-	13000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
		ADU Powders	4	2	219	191.4	-	2	92	53.34	-	2	2	2	3
	Al Tuwaitha Bldg. 73 A&B	FF Pins	4	46	-	14	-	46	-	14	-	46	10	46	-
		UO ₂ Pellets	4	1	-	26	-	1	29.25	25.8	-	1	1	1	3
		UO ₂ Slurry	4	8	-	164	-	8	1181.5	206.15	-	8	8	8	10
		UO ₂ Powders	3	23	-	1850	-	23	2024.4	1755.15	-	23	23	23	2
Akashat & Brazil	(30 July Project)	Mix U Oxides	3	19	-	160	-	19	200.5	172.21	-	19	19	19	2
		U ₂ O ₇ Powders	3,4	5	-	500	-	5	154.9	130.99	-	5	5	5	2
		UF ₆ Powders	3,4	2	-	30	-	2	78.2	56.18	-	2	2	2	2

I = item counting, B = weighing, D = sample analysis, NDA = non-destructive analysis
 FF = Fresh Fuel

UNSC 687

SUMMARY OF INSPECTION RESULTS

12th On-Site Inspection

Table 1 (cont.3)

Location C

ORIGIN	Processing Site	Material Type	Presented to Team No.	DECLARED INVENTORY				VERIFIED INVENTORY							
				No. of Items	Compound Weight (kg)	Element Weight (kg)	U ₂₃₅ (kg)	No. of Items	Compound Weight (kg)	Element Weight (kg)	U ₂₃₅ (kg)	Verification Activities			
												I	NDA	B	D
Akashat & Brazil	Al Tuwaitha Bldg. 73 C (30 July Project)	NU	3	-	1360	-	9	1991.5	1314.4	-	9	9	9	2	
			24	-	3424	-	24	4599.3	3187.8	-	24	24	24	34	
			21	-	1020	-	21	-	1023.4	-	21	21	21	5	
			4	-	46	-	4	146.2	73.73	-	4	4	4	5	
		12	-	200	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	1		
USSR (Exempted)	Al Tuwaitha Bldg. 9	LEU (10%)	1,4,10	11	-	2.464	0.246	11	-	1.949	0.190	11	11	11	13
				1	-	0.940	0.065	1	1.373	0.934	0.064	1	1	1	1
		LEU (6.9%)													
		LEU (10%)													

I = item counting, B = weighing, D = sample analysis, NDA = non-destructive analysis
NU = Natural Uranium

SUMMARY OF INSPECTION RESULTS

12th On-Site Inspection

Table 2

Location B

ORIGIN	Processing Site	Material Type	Presented to Team No.	DECLARED INVENTORY				VERIFIED INVENTORY							
				No. of Items	Compound Weight (gm)	Element Weight (gm)	U ₂₃₅ (gm)	No. of Items	Compound Weight (gm)	Element Weight (gm)	U ₂₃₅ (gm)	Verification Activities			
France	Tamuz-2 Bldg. 24	HEU (93%)	1	38	-	11874	11050	38	-	11874	11050	38	98	-	-
		HEU* (80%)	1	20	-	3933	3165	20	-	3933	3165	20	20	-	-
		HEU (36%)	1	3	-	1002	360	3	-	1002	360	3	3	-	-
		LEU (10%)	1	69	-	87760	8776	69	-	87760	8776	69	69	-	-
Al Qaim		NU	4	2	-	7900	-	2	-	7900	-	2	2	-	-
		-	1	7	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	7	-	-	1
France		Beryllium blocks													

I = item counting, B = weighing, D = sample analysis, NDA = non-destructive analysis
 HEU = High Enriched Uranium, LEU = Low Enriched Uranium, NU = Natural uranium
 * Six elements in tank no. 14 contain control rods

UNSC 687

12th On-Site Inspection

SUMMARY OF INSPECTION RESULTS

Table 3

IRT-5000 Reactor


ORIGIN	Processing Site	Material Type	Presented to Team No.	DECLARED INVENTORY				VERIFIED INVENTORY							
				No. of Items	Compound Weight (kg)	Element Weight (kg)	U ₂₃₅ (kg)	No. of Items	Compound Weight (kg)	Element Weight (kg)	U ₂₃₅ (kg)	Verification Activities			
												I	ND	A	D
USSR	IRT-5000 Reactor	HEU (80%)	1	76	-	15291	12232	76	-	15291	12232	76	68	-	-
		-	1	17	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	17	-	-	-

= item counting, B = weighing, D = sample analysis, NDA = non-destructive analysis
HEU = High Enriched Uranium

I = item counting, B = weighing, D = sample analysis, NDA = non-destructive analysis
HEU = High Enriched Uranium

(NOT UNDER IAEA SEALS)

FIGURE 4: LEFT SIDE STORAGE OF LOCATION C



On-Site Inspection 12

UNSC 687

FIGURE 5: RIGHT SIDE STORAGE OF LOCATION C

